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The Times

GREAT BRITAIN

AND THE

Dutch Republics of South Africa.

A Summary of the Historical Relations between Great
Britain and The Transvaal and Orange Free
State; giving a true account of
the present War in
South Africa.

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УВАЖАЈ! ОБОРНАТ?

GREAT BRITAIN and the DUTCH REPUBLICS.

[*Reprinted from the London Times.*]

I.

INTRODUCTORY.

In view of President Steyn's New Year's message to the burghers of the Free State, alluding to the "enemy who has oppressed and persecuted us during the whole of the last century," and of opinions genuinely, and it may be believed sometimes reluctantly, held in certain quarters on the Continent, it may be useful to present a summary of the historical relations between Great Britain and the Dutch Republics of South Africa. The history of the South African States is so little known that even among British readers the facts are far from being so familiar as to enable the majority of Englishmen to understand on how strong a position this country takes its stand in the present war.

It is with the history of the Transvaal that we are more especially concerned. That history divides itself naturally into three sections—the period before annexation, annexation, and the period after annexation. Each of these forms a chapter in itself, and will be found to have its bearing on the actual situation.

Slavery was abolished throughout the British dominions in 1834. The emancipation of slaves without what was considered as full compensation gave rise at the Cape, as in the West Indian Islands, to an industrial crisis, and was the cause of very serious and, to some extent, legitimate complaint on the part of the large slaveowners. At the Cape the employers of slave labor were principally Dutch farmers, and their objection was not only to the dislocation of the industry which resulted from the compulsory sale at a price below market value of their slave property, but also, and very strongly, to the philanthropic principle of equality which the abolition of slavery involved. There were also other grievances, some of which were not altogether unlike those of which the Uitlanders of the Transvaal now complain. An important distinction between the grievances of the Dutch population of the Cape of that day and the contemporary grievance of the Uitlander is, however, to be found in the fact that the difficulties at the Cape had their rise in a period before the great Reform Bill, when many British subjects in the United Kingdom suffered under similar disabilities. While not minimizing any real cause of complaint which affected the agricultural population of Cape Colony, we must bear in mind that what was suffered was not suffered as the special hardship of an alien portion of the community. It was the common lot of British citizens similarly situated throughout the Empire. The world had not yet risen to the full conception of the political equality of all citizens before the law. The Dutch of the Cape had never been a free community. They had been subjected before the British conquest to arbitrary rule from Holland, and historians agree that

development in this form was not long maintained. Kaffir wars upon the frontier of Cape Colony brought their lessons, and the next Governor of the Cape, Sir Harry Smith, prepared to substitute a policy of controlling the natives and extending direct sovereignty over the settlement of the emigrant farmers. The native treaties were modified in 1847, and on February 3, 1848, a proclamation was issued adding to the dominions of the British Crown, under the name of the Orange River Sovereignty, the territory extending between the Orange and Vaal rivers.

But irritation between the emigrant farmers and the British Government had by that time grown too strong. A party of the emigrant farmers elected a certain Andries Pretorius to be their commandant, and rose in arms to establish the independence of their settlement. A battle took place at Boomplaat on August 29, 1848. The Dutch were defeated. The sovereignty of Great Britain was vindicated, and, as had happened in Natal, that portion of the Dutch population which was opposed to British rule withdrew from the country. They migrated, under the leadership of Pretorius, to the country north of the Vaal, though they were again fully warned that that territory also lay within the sphere of British influence. The present Dutch population of the Free State is composed of the descendants of those who preferred to remain under British rule, reinforced by further emigration from the Cape. These in the case of the Free State formed a considerable body of the inhabitants.

Thus we have the formation and settlement of Natal and the Orange Free State, where in both cases only those settlers remained who were on the whole disposed to recognize the advantages of British rule. The irreconcilable and turbulent sections in all cases drifted to the Transvaal. The sections of Dutch population which went to the Transvaal were no less bitterly antagonistic to the sections of their own countrymen which they left behind them than they were to British rule. Consequently intercourse was rare. The race of the Transvaal Dutch has from the beginning been to some extent differentiated from the remaining Dutch population of South Africa, and the history of the Transvaal forms a chapter apart. It will be seen that the lawless nature of its population continued for a long time to characterize the new settlement, and that when the Boers of the Transvaal had no one else with whom to fight they fought continuously with one another.

The autonomous existence of the Transvaal province was established in the following conditions. In the early years of the Orange River Sovereignty the British Government reaped the results of the encouragement which it had given to native pretensions. Hottentots, Tembus, Kosas, Basutos, had all in turn at considerable cost to be subdued. The difficulties encountered in these wars made the whole movement of Imperial extension extremely unpopular at home, and in the midst of the perplexities aroused by the necessity for active operations on the spot and lukewarm support from headquarters, Sir Harry Smith found himself confronted simultaneously by an antagonistic movement of the Republican faction in the Orange River Sovereignty, and by a request on the part of the proscribed leaders on the far side of the Vaal that old differences might be forgotten, and their independence in that territory be granted to them by a treaty of friendship with Great Britain.

At home the Little England movement was in full progress. Diffi-

culties which culminated in the Crimean War were making themselves felt upon the Continent. The strongest objections were entertained in high quarters to any further projects of annexation. On the spot the daily difficulties of the situation were overwhelming. Accordingly in January of 1852 commissioners were sent to the Orange sovereignty. They met the representatives of the emigrant farmers of the Vaal on the borders of the Sand River within the northern limits of the Orange province, and after some discussion the treaty known as the Sand River Convention was signed on January 17, 1852.

The principal conditions of the treaty were that Great Britain agreed to recognize within the limits of her sphere of influence the independence of the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal, with the understanding that there was to be absolute freedom for traders and missionaries to travel and prosecute their business on both sides of the river, and that there should be no slavery in the Transvaal.

Before turning to the exclusive history of the Transvaal it is well to note here that in 1854 the same inspiration from home which dictated the grant of independence to the Transvaal dictated also the withdrawal of the Queen's sovereignty from the Orange Free State. This was done on the initiative of the British Government, and in the first instance in strong opposition to the wishes of the inhabitants as expressed through a committee or assembly of ninety-five elected delegates. The objections of the population were finally overcome, but not without widely supported protest of a most vigorous description. Many of the inhabitants declared their intention of nailing the British flag half-mast high and holding out under arms until the question had been reconsidered by the British Parliament. But, notwithstanding the strong feeling which was expressed, British dominion and sovereignty over the Orange River territory was renounced by a Royal proclamation signed on January 30, 1854.

In this brief summary of events preceding the establishment of the Dutch Republics, there are three main points to be noted: First, that the whole of South Africa up to 25° south latitude was, subsequently to the Napoleonic wars, definitely recognized as falling within the British sphere of influence; secondly, that the emigrant farmers received repeated official notice that, though they were free to settle where they pleased, they could not divest themselves within the British sphere of influence of their quality as British subjects, nor be permitted to establish an independent form of government; thirdly, that notwithstanding these conditions Great Britain did grant to the emigrant farmers the independence they desired, and allowed them to establish within the British sphere of influence separate States possessing the form of government which they preferred. Such conduct on the part of Great Britain can hardly be qualified as oppressive.

II.

THE TRANSVAAL BEFORE ANNEXATION.

By the Sand River Convention of 1852 and the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 Great Britain thus brought into existence on a continent where her possessions had been supposed to extend until they met the

with the establishment of any practical system of taxation. The population was exhausted with chronic war. In 1871 the President, powerless to effect an arrangement of his difficulties, agreed to submit the western frontier question to British arbitration, and accepted an award made by Mr. Keate, the Governor of Natal. The award gave territory and independence to the native tribes, and also cut off an important district in the neighborhood of the diamond fields, to which the Transvaal laid claim. The dissatisfaction of the Transvaal was so great that President Pretorius resigned and his place was filled by Mr. Burgers, who was a man of far greater cultivation, and, in an intellectual sense, superior attainments.

Up to this period in Transvaal history there had been no development in the ordinary sense of civilization. Lack of revenue had prevented the creation of the ordinary machinery of life. The salaries of officials were seldom paid; there were no bridges, few roads, no public buildings, no telegraphs, no schools. The treasury was always empty. Commerce was carried on by means of barter, and taxes were not collected. President Burgers endeavored to introduce a new order of things. He came to Europe and succeeded in raising part of a loan authorized by the Volksraad for the construction of a railway. He also engaged European instructors with the intention of establishing a system of education. He would seem, in fact, to have entertained the conceptions of an enlightened ruler, and to have desired to carry them into execution. But his people, rough in their origin, had become demoralized almost to barbarism by 20 years of savage isolation from all civilized influences. They had associated freely with Kaffirs, their habits had approximated to those of the natives, and President Burger's schemes were wholly frustrated by the conditions which prevailed.

Another native war, led by the formidable chief Sikukuni, broke out. The country was exhausted by ceaseless fighting. The local system of "commandos," that is, of men commandeered to fight in the public interest, proved ineffectual. The President himself led an expedition against Sikukuni. Nothing could make his men keep the field. It was resolved to substitute a system of paid forces. To meet the expense heavy war taxes were imposed. They could not be collected. The country broke down under the strain. The interest on the public debt could not be paid. Administrative charges could not be met. The one-pound notes issued by the Government as currency sank to the value of one shilling.

Without money, without men, with a fiercely triumphant native enemy within its borders, the condition of the Transvaal was almost desperate. At the lowest moment of the fortunes of the Republic it became evident that natives on all sides were preparing to attack. Sikukuni and other chiefs were in arms on the northeast, north and west. The Matabele, though driven to the country now known as Mataberland, were still unbroken in their martial pride. The Zulus under Cetewayo had declared their intention of invading the Transvaal from the south. Annihilation threatened the Republic. The alternative which lay before it was to pay the long reckoning of a quarter of a century and be wiped out by the blacks or to place itself under the protection of a stronger *white* Power. In its extremity an important section of the country, a

section headed by the principal officials, turned to Great Britain for protection.

There can be no doubt in the mind of any one who reads the official reports relating to the annexation of the Transvaal that the transaction was carried through on the invitation and with the sympathy of the ruling factions, and it must be remembered that the Transvaal from the beginning of its history had always been ruled by faction. Unanimity in any of its public movements was practically unknown.

ANNEXATION.

To enter into the details of the negotiations which led to the annexation of the Transvaal would be outside the scope of the present sketch. President Burgers, in a statement made before his death, briefly summarized the situation by saying that the English party in the Transvaal urged forward annexation and that the Dopper party led by Paul Kruger allied themselves with the English in order to upset the reigning faction. He was anxious at the time of making the statement to repudiate his own share in the transaction. But it is perfectly clear not only from Sir Theophilus Shepstone's despatches but from the public speeches of President Burgers that the President himself was in favor of annexation. In his despatches Sir Theophilus speaks of the President "who has been all along in full accord with me," and again says "the President has from the first fully acquiesced in the necessity for the change." President Burgers, speaking to the Raad a few weeks before annexation actually took place, told the members in round terms that it was the Boers themselves who "had lost the country." "You," he said, "have ill-treated the natives, you have shot them down, you have sold them into slavery, and now you have to pay the penalty." And, "if you ask what the English have to do with it, I tell you that as little as we can allow barbarities among the Kaffirs on our borders as little can they allow that in a State on their borders anarchy and rebellion should prevail." After detailing the miserable position of the country and declaring it to have been brought about because "they had lost faith in God, reliance upon themselves, or trust in each other," he advised them that to take up arms and fight was nonsense and that their duty was "to come to an arrangement with the British Government and to do so in a bold and manly manner."

Such language used by the head of the State can only be held to have one meaning. Thus we see the English faction, the Dopper faction (representing the local Opposition), and the official faction all combining to favor annexation. There remained a faction known as the "Irreconcilables," who would now probably be called the back-country Boers. The existence of this faction was held to justify some hedging on the part of responsible officials, and it was made a matter of diplomatic argument between Mr. Burgers and Sir Theophilus Shepstone that, while as a matter of fact the President was in favor of annexation, he should, "to save his face" with the Irreconcilables, publish an official protest. Here is the account given by Sir Theophilus Shepstone to his official superiors of the transaction:

"There will be a protest against my act of annexation. . . . You

need not be disquieted by such action, because it is taken merely to save appearances and the members of the Government from the violence of a faction that seems for years to have held Pretoria in terror when any act of the Government displeased it.

You will better understand this when I tell you privately that the President has from the first fully acquiesced in the necessity for the change, and that most of the members of the Government have expressed themselves anxious for it, but none of them have had the courage openly to express their opinions. . . . Yesterday morning Mr. Burgers came to me to arrange how the matter should be done. I read to him the draft of my Proclamation. . . . He brought to me a number of conditions which he wished me to insert, which I have accepted and have embodied in my Proclamation. He told me he could not help issuing a protest to keep the noisy portion of his people quiet. . . . Mr. Burgers read me, too, the draft of his protest and asked me if I saw any objection to it or thought it too strong. I said that it appeared to me to pledge the people to resist by and by, to which he replied that it was to tide over the difficulty of the moment, seeing that my support—the troops—were a fortnight's march distant, and that by the time the answer to the protest came all desire of opposition would have died out. I, therefore, did not persuade him from his protest."

Whatever may be thought of the wisdom or weakness of Sir Theophilus Shepstone in countenancing such a compromise there can be no doubt of the light in which it was presented to him, and of the attitude which it implied in official Transvaal circles. Outside official circles there was a strong agitation in favor of annexation and a petition bearing 3,000 signatures out of a total male population of 8,800, was presented in favor of it. The Act of Annexation, when it was proclaimed on April 12, 1877, was put in operation without force, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone was supported only at Pretoria by the presence of 25 policemen. Shortly afterwards, the leading Boer officials, including Paul Kruger, but with one exception of the present commandant, General Joubert, took office under the British Government. President Burgers retired to Cape Colony.

As an immediate result of annexation the financial difficulties of the Transvaal came to an end. Interest on the public debt was paid. The Civil Service was reorganized, and an era of industrial prosperity was inaugurated by a considerable influx into the country of traders and others willing to invest their capital and energy under the guarantee of the British flag. The country was occupied by British troops and secured from the danger of local native rising. The Zulu war, of which the result was to destroy the military power of the most formidable of the native enemies of the Transvaal, followed in 1879 at a cost of upwards of £6,000,000 to Great Britain. The power of Sikukuni was afterwards broken, and by the end of 1879 all the most serious conditions which had led the responsible authorities of the Transvaal to acquiesce in annexation had been removed.

The people had obtained the benefits of annexation. They had profited to the full by the change in their position from a bankrupt and friendless State isolated on the borders of civilization and threatened with destruction by savage enemies to that of the fully protected province

of a wealthy Empire. In these circumstances the opinion of the country underwent a change. Certain advantages had been bought by the sacrifice of independence. Having obtained the advantages the people began to wish to recover the independence which they now saw themselves placed in a position to maintain. A monster petition, bearing 6,500 signatures—amongst which must have been many that had been affixed to the petition asking for annexation—was despatched to England praying that annexation might be cancelled. In their previous dealings with Great Britain the Boers had been accustomed to find their requests acceded to, and their hopes of achieving a result satisfactory to themselves were in this instance encouraged by events at home.

In November of 1879 Mr. Gladstone began the Midlothian campaign, in which he condemned in the strongest terms the annexation of the Transvaal and practically pledged himself, in the event of his coming into power, to repudiate it. It is illustrative of the importance which may attach on the outskirts of the Empire to party statements made in this country that the portions of Mr. Gladstone's speeches referring to South Africa were reprinted and distributed on separate slips of paper throughout the Transvaal. His utterances were accepted there as a direct invitation to revolt. In March of 1880 the British Parliament was dissolved, and as a result of the elections Mr. Gladstone was returned to power. The Boers, who had formerly thanked him when in opposition for his sympathy, expected him when in power to meet their views. But in the Queen's speech of May 20th the intention was announced of maintaining the supremacy of Great Britain over the Transvaal. The decision of the Government in regard to the matter was communicated by telegram to the British High Commissioner in the following terms:—"Under no circumstances can the Queen's authority in the Transvaal be relinquished."

Boer hopes had been raised too high to be abandoned. From this date the preparations for revolt were carried forward. The old system adopted towards their own Governments when unpopular or of refusal to pay taxes was resorted to. The determination of the British Administrator, Sir Owen Lanyon, to enforce payment by the seizure of the goods of a recalcitrant farmer led to open defiance. A great meeting was held at Paardekraal in which Messrs. Paul Kruger, Pretorius and Joubert were elected as a triumvirate to conduct the affairs of government, and on December 16, 1880, the independence of the Republic was declared.

War followed, which ended on February 27, 1881, in the British disaster of Majuba Hill. Four hundred and twenty British soldiers were on that occasion overwhelmed and driven from a strong position by a force of only 155 Boers. Small as were the numbers involved the incident was accepted as the pivot of the policy of the British Government. There had been no intention in the first instance to annex the Transvaal against the will of the inhabitants of the country. It was now taken for proved that the majority of the population of the Transvaal desired that the annexation should be cancelled, and it was determined to meet their wishes. The country was given back to them, and the compensation which Great Britain required for the heavy expenditure in blood and money undertaken on their account in the Zulu and other wars was contained in certain conditions attached to the retrocession. The Transvaal

was no longer to be entirely independent. It was to have internal self-government, subject to the suzerainty of the British Crown. Its frontier limits were defined. White men of all nationalities were to have equal rights with the burghers of the Transvaal to reside, travel and carry on business in the country, and were to be subject to no special taxation. Black men were to have freedom and their interests were safeguarded by certain other clauses. Adapted to the more developed features of the situation, and with the important difference that the Transvaal was no longer to be an independent State, the conditions were in substance the same as those of the Sand River Convention—namely, equal rights for white men and freedom for blacks. Both of those conditions have been recognized as essential to the well-being of South Africa. Oppression of the blacks had been found to result in native wars, of which the disastrous effects were not confined to the borders of the oppressing State. It was impossible that a vast territory through which railways had begun to spread could be economically developed unless freedom of travel and equality of industrial opportunity were secured to the white inhabitants in all its parts. Equality of political rights, without which no true equality of industrial opportunity can be maintained, at that time existed in the Transvaal. Mr. Kruger was spokesman for the triumvirate when in conducting the negotiations for peace he undertook that political equality should be maintained, and satisfied with his assurance the British negotiators failed to require that an express provision regarding political rights should be inserted in the Convention that embodied the terms of peace. The Convention was signed in August, 1881.

It has been assumed that because after the Zulu and Sikukuni wars had been carried to a successful termination by British troops the Boers showed themselves genuinely desirous to regain the independence of their country, therefore there had never existed any strong desire for annexation. A study of the actual facts would seem to show that both desires were perfectly genuine. Until the power of the surrounding native tribes was broken, and some sort of financial stability established, it was impossible for the Transvaal to exist as an independent community, and if Great Britain had refused to annex, the desire on the part of the Transvaal for annexation would probably, under the stress of circumstances, have grown more and more keenly urgent. Great Britain has reason to regret that she did not wait. The desire of the Boers was perfectly wise. Annexation was an almost unmixed benefit to the Transvaal. Notwithstanding some inevitable blunders, Great Britain did for it in three years what, even if it had survived immediate danger of extinction, it might have taken thirty years to do for itself. But, the circumstances being altered, the purposes for which annexation was acquiesced in being accomplished, the revolution of sentiment was complete and the annexationists of 1877 became the independents of 1880. In both instances the British Government acceded too hastily to local wishes, and gained a *minimum* of advantage to itself. Far from being oppressive in its conduct it laid itself open to the charge of weakness, and in face of the retrocession of the country after so unimportant a skirmish as Majuba it cannot with any justice be accused of having shown a desire to impose its will by force upon a weaker people. The policy adopted after Majuba is now universally regarded as a blunder, but in relation to the Boers it

was a generous blunder. British interests in South Africa have suffered severely from its consequences, but if it did nothing else it should have closed forever the mouths of those who complain that Great Britain has oppressed the Transvaal.

III.

AFTER ANNEXATION.

It has been seen that the original settlement of the Transvaal was effected by a specially lawless residue of Dutch population sorted as it were twice over in Natal and in the Orange Free State, under the pressure of armed conflict with Great Britain, from their more peaceably disposed fellow settlers. Animosity to Great Britain, subdued only at recurrent intervals for purposes of self-interest, had from first to last constituted the keynote of Transvaal policy. This has not been the case with the general Dutch population of South Africa, and until lately there remained a marked division between the Dutch of the Transvaal and of other portions of South Africa.

Animosity to Great Britain was for a time subdued in order to obtain the charter of independence granted by the Sand River Convention. In the twenty-five years which elapsed between the grant of independence and annexation the conditions of the Convention were openly and continuously violated. Animosity to Great Britain was again subdued in order to obtain the benefits of annexation. These benefits were no sooner secured than the Dutch portion of the population rose in arms demanding that annexation should be cancelled. Great Britain acquiesced. The annexation was cancelled. In the year which followed the signature of the Convention of 1881 Mr. Kruger was elected President. Before annexation the Transvaal had hardly existed as a State. Its history, subsequent to annexation, has been the history of President Kruger. The nominal republic has been a despotism tempered by corruption, of which this remarkable man has known how to keep the full control in his own hands. It is scarcely too much to say that from the day of his election the policy of the Transvaal has consisted of one long endeavor to escape from the terms of its engagements with Great Britain.

One of the effects of annexation in bringing the country from its previous condition of a semi-barbarous community to an organized state was to make the Transvaal better known to civilized powers. In the years succeeding 1881, President Kruger began to cultivate foreign relations, and one of the earliest objections to the Convention was the inconvenience caused by the provision that these relations should be conducted only through British channels. A desire to escape from the control of the suzerainty and to establish his country as an independent state, having the same relation to the world at large which it had once enjoyed towards its fellow states and colonies in South Africa, very naturally followed from the enlarged view which President Kruger began to take of his own importance, and from a sense of the disadvantage at which he found himself placed in treating with foreign powers.

Simultaneously with the desire for an enlargement of his political *status* came a desire for the expansion of his frontiers. Far more land had been allotted by the Convention to the Transvaal than its population

has to this day been able to occupy, but looking to west and east and north and south, Mr. Kruger coveted an extension of territory.

The first actual breach of the Convention took place in connection with the observance of the western frontier bordering upon Bechuanaland. Here, within a few months of the signature of the Convention, bodies of Boers whom the authorities at Pretoria professed themselves to be unable to control raided the border, and within two years they had established in Bechuanaland two republics known as Stellaland and Goshen. Attempts were made by the Cape Government to settle the matter by peaceful negotiations. These proved ineffectual, and ultimately it was found necessary to send out the expedition commanded by Sir Charles Warren, which, although no fighting took place, settled the matter satisfactorily in 1885. It may be incidentally mentioned that this breach of the Convention by the Boers cost Great Britain about £2,000,000 in money, as well as much trouble and disturbance on the borders of Cape Colony. The clauses relating to the natives were also disregarded, and a war with Mapoch, one of the northern chiefs, resulted in the distribution of no less than 8,000 natives as "apprentices" amongst the victorious commando.

Within two years of the signing of the Convention it became evident that that document must be revised; but it was not, as might have been anticipated, from Great Britain that representations to this effect proceeded.

Towards the end of 1883 the Transvaal asked permission to send a deputation to London for the purpose of reconsidering the Convention and of obtaining relief from some of the conditions which they felt to be onerous. The proposal was accepted, and a deputation consisting of Mr. Kruger and two other delegates arrived in England in November of that year. The ambitions with which the delegates entered upon the negotiations are placed on record in a draft Convention which they presented for consideration to Lord Derby. The first of their desires was that they should be recognized as an independent state, negotiating on terms of equality with her Majesty's Government, such a recognition carrying, of course, the right to negotiate their own foreign treaties, and to be free of interference in regard to native affairs. They were at once informed that neither in form nor substance could such a treaty as they had drafted be accepted. Independence was absolutely refused, the right of the Queen to veto their foreign treaties was maintained; but modifications were granted in respect of some important minor points.

The negotiations resulted in a second Convention, of which "Her Majesty was pleased to direct" that the articles should be substituted for the articles of the Convention of 1881. The second Convention was signed on February 27th, of 1884. It has been the custom to speak of it as according complete internal independence to the Transvaal. As a matter of fact, it maintained the conditions of the Convention of 1881 in regard to the rights of aliens, the rights of natives, renunciation of slavery or apprenticeship, freedom of religion, and most favored-nation treatment for British goods. Articles 8, 9, 14 and 19 distinctly lay down conditions which, if disregarded, would give to her Majesty's Government right of internal interference. There has been much discussion as to whether a direct expression of the suzerainty of the Crown was or was

not retained in the modified Convention. The discussion may be dismissed as beside the mark, for there is no question that, whether the preamble containing the word was retained or eliminated, the substance expressed by the word was definitely retained.

The Convention of 1884 gave the Boers more than they had expected, though not all that they had desired. The deputation expressed themselves as satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations; and Mr. Kruger signified his acceptance of the new order of things by the publication in the London newspapers of a cordial invitation and promise of welcome and protection to Englishmen who cared to settle in the Transvaal. To those who are behind the scenes it is known that this invitation was issued for financial reasons to reassure the British owners of Transvaal mining properties whom at that time President Kruger thought it well to conciliate. Nevertheless, whatever his "reasons" for issuing the invitation, he cannot now repudiate his own act, or say with accuracy that the immigration of Uitlanders into his country was made against his will. In this, as in other bargains, he has reaped a very substantial benefit; and, having reaped the benefit, he appeals to the sympathy of the world to enable him to repudiate his share of the bargain.

It was at this period, after the conclusion of the Convention of 1884, that Mr. Kruger paid a visit to Holland and Germany, and also invited from those countries the immigration of Hollanders and Germans which has since played so conspicuous a part in the development of Transvaal affairs. The history of the Transvaal entered from this period upon a new phase.

The Convention of 1884 has been no better kept than the Sand River Convention and the Convention of 1881. The endeavor has, of course, been more or less steadily maintained to observe the letter, while the spirit has been persistently contravened; but there has been more than one important breach of the letter. This document laid down a rectified boundary of the Transvaal, which, by a special clause, the Transvaal Government bound itself faithfully to observe. Nevertheless, within a year it was necessary to send Sir Charles Warren's expedition, already alluded to, to the Bechuanaland frontier. In the same year the Boers invaded Zululand, and the intervention of the British Government did not prevent the establishment across the border, in the most fertile district of Zululand, of the New Republic, which was recognized as a Boer State in 1886 and became part of the Transvaal in 1887. The question of the New Republic was no sooner settled in the Boer interest than the Transvaal authorities turned their attention to Swaziland, of which the independence had been specially guaranteed by the 12th Article of the Convention. Attempts in this direction were less immediately successful, but after many incidents, of which some had nearly led to armed intervention on the part of Great Britain, President Kruger's will ultimately prevailed, and Swaziland is now practically a dependency of the Transvaal. A similar attempt was made on the independence of Tongaland, upon the southeastern frontier of the Transvaal, but the Queen of Tongaland sought safety in the protection of Great Britain, whose suzerainty she accepted in 1887. The next attempt to enlarge the Transvaal borders was made upon the northern frontier, when in 1890, one year after the grant of a Royal charter to Mr. Rhodes, an immense trek was organized

for the purpose of establishing a Boer Republic in chartered territories. That attempt was foiled by the firm attitude of the High Commissioner and of Dr. Jameson, who met the trek on the Limpopo with a body of the British Bechuanaland Police, while the High Commissioner informed President Kruger that for his people to cross the river under the circumstances would constitute an act of war. There remained still the native territories of Zambaan and Umbegesa on the east coast between the Portuguese boundary and that of Zululand. The final attempt of the Transvaal was made in this direction, but was met by the annexation of the territories by Great Britain, who extended the frontier of her protectorate to the Portuguese frontier in 1895.

All these attempts, it is to be remembered, were made in contravention of the strict agreement of the Convention of 1884, under which the Transvaal bound itself faithfully to respect the frontier therein laid down. The last hope of obtaining an extension of territory on African soil was thus closed to President Kruger in 1895.

In the meantime, events developing strangely within the Transvaal, had given him, without extension of territory, an enormous aggrandisement of power. When he returned from his foreign tour in the latter end of 1884, he was in very serious straits for money. The old difficulties of the Transvaal were as acute as ever. Native disturbances were rife. Mr. Joubert, who had acted as President during Mr. Kruger's absence, on the return of the Presidential party resigned all the offices, and placed himself at the head of a faction which charged Mr. Kruger's anti-English retrogressive policy with responsibility for the "bad condition of the country," and has ever since remained as a thorn in President Kruger's side. The country Boers, as was their custom when dissension reigned between the higher authorities of Pretoria, refused to pay their taxes, and by the end of 1885 bankruptcy seemed once more inevitable.

But in the following year the discovery of gold was made in the banket formation of the Witwatersrand. The Rand was proclaimed as a gold field on July 18, 1886, and from that moment the future of the Transvaal was changed.

It is impossible here to relate the history of the development of the Johannesburg gold fields. The material effect on the Transvaal can be perhaps sufficiently summarized in two sets of figures. The financial position of the State in 1884 was that it owed £396,000, of which the security was uncertain, and on which the possibility of paying interest was doubtful; the revenue of the country was £143,000; the expenditure was £184,000; and there was the unpleasant fact to face that while the expenditure was already in excess of revenue by about 25 per cent. revenue had fallen from the preceding year by a very nearly similar amount. In 1897—before the financial position had been disturbed by the approach of war—the revenue had risen to £4,480,000; the expenditure was £4,394,000; and interest on a debt of £3,000,000 was, of course, assured. How substantially the Boers themselves as individuals have profited by the change may be inferred from a comparison of the salary list of the two periods. In 1884 the salaries of officials were by force of circumstances a negligible quantity. But in 1886, the year of the gold discovery of the Rand, when the situation had already begun

to improve, they offer a fair ground of comparison. In that year the total amount paid was £51,000. Thirteen years later it had risen to a total of £1,216,394, a sum which, according to a recent calculation, is sufficient to provide every adult male of the small Dutch population of the Transvaal with £40 a year.

So unprecedented a development of wealth could not take place without a complete change in the conditions of the country. As is well known, this wealth was produced from the gold fields and their attendant industries, the revenue of the country rising steadily in sympathy with the output of gold. In 1887, the year after the work had been fairly started on the Witwatersrand, the value of the output was £500,000. Last year it had reached the total of £16,000,000. This result has been wholly effected by the industry of aliens, known in the Transvaal under the generic name of Uitlanders, the larger proportion of whom are British subjects. The Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal have never themselves taken any part in the development of the mining industry. Nor have they permitted the Uitlanders to take any part in the administration of the country. Thus two distinct populations have established themselves side by side, and a new Transvaal has grown up within the old. With the expansion of the gold industry the numbers of the Uitlander population have increased. At the end of 1895 immigrants were pouring into the Transvaal at the rate of 1000 per week. The population statistics as published by the Transvaal cannot be relied upon, but the Uitlander population, which is largely composed of adult males, was believed before the war to outnumber the Boer population by a little over two to one.

Of these two populations, growing at an unequal rate side by side, the one supplied all the industrial energy by which the development of the country was assured, the other reserved to itself all rights of government and all the emoluments of official position. To state the situation is to show the inherent impossibility of its continuance. We have only to apply the conditions to the most stable European Government, and ask, What would be its fate if it ventured to govern in defiance of all the wealth, the energy, and the industrial interests of the country?

It was inevitable that the Uitlander population should seek to exercise some influence over the government of the country. Had Mr. Kruger accepted their advances and perceived the wisdom of incorporating the new element of population on a footing of equality with the old the progress of the Transvaal would have been far greater than it has been, and its independence as a cosmopolitan republic would have been almost certainly assured. His resistance to the Uitlander claim for equal treatment and his substitution for that sober policy of progressive development from within of a visionary scheme of impossible aggrandisement from without have created the present position.

The story of the Uitlanders' grievances, of their vain efforts to obtain reform by constitutional methods in the Transvaal, and of their final appeal as British subjects to Great Britain has been too fully before the public of late to need recapitulation in detail. Mr. Kruger has blindly refused to see the immense opportunity which lay at his hand. Great Britain would have co-operated with him cordially in building up and developing a Transvaal State loyal to its engagements, and forming,

for all practical purposes, a part of the British development of South Africa. The one thing which it was impossible for Great Britain to permit was the expansion of the Transvaal at British expense, or the political activity of the Transvaal as an instrument for the destruction of British supremacy in a part of the world in which the maintenance of her paramount position is of vital importance to the Empire.

But it has been to this impossible aim that President Kruger has misdirected his ambition. The last hope of obtaining an extension of territory on African soil was closed to him, as has been seen, in 1895, when British and Portuguese protectorates on the east coast became continuous. Already foreseeing, perhaps, this conclusion, he had turned his attention to more ambitious hopes of a foreign alliance which would enable him to counterbalance the power of Great Britain in South Africa.

In dealing with this phase of the South African question we are on uncertain ground and are unable to say with accuracy how much was done. Dr. Leyds was credited with being the principal instrument of this policy, and it is more than probable that Dr. Leyds may have had his own reasons for magnifying his achievements at European courts. The fourth article of the Convention of 1884, maintaining the Queen's veto upon foreign treaties, rendered it impossible for any foreign treaty openly inimical to England to be concluded. There can be no doubt that an extensive secret service was established, and that emissaries of the Transvaal, more or less accredited, were busy on the continent. Orders for arms were placed with European firms. Fruitless efforts were made to acquire Delagoa Bay as a Transvaal port, and substantial rumors were current that a South African rising backed by foreign support, and having for its object the establishment of an independent United States of South Africa was in contemplation. As early as 1892 it was reported that a detailed scheme, bearing the name of the German Consul, had been drawn up in Pretoria for the landing of German troops at Delagoa Bay. It was known that the reorganization of the Transvaal forces was being placed in German hands. Very considerable annoyance was caused in commercial circles by secret advantages given, in defiance of the Convention, to German firms. The immense supplies of arms and ammunition which were known to be pouring into the Transvaal, and the construction of forts near Pretoria and Johannesburg were matters of uneasiness; and in the early part of 1895 President Kruger gave confirmation, which was at the time supposed to be intentional, to the growing suspicions. A banquet was given in honor of the German Emperor's birthday. At the banquet President Kruger made a speech in which, after contrasting the conduct of Germans and of British subjects in the Transvaal and warmly eulogizing the former, he continued:

"Therefore I shall ever promote the interests of Germany, though it be but with the resources of a child such as my land is considered. This child is now being trodden upon by one great Power, and the natural consequence is that it seeks protection from another. The time has come to knit ties of the closest friendship between Germany and the South African Republic, ties such as are natural between father and child."

About the same time the formula of "South Africa British or Lower German" began to be commonly used in German colonial circles on the continent. This was before the Jameson raid.

It has been frequently and incorrectly stated that the armaments of the Transvaal, and the endeavor to effect a foreign alliance were the outcome of a mistrust of England roused by the raid. This is so far from being the case that one of the chief complaints made by the Uitlanders through the medium of the National Union in 1895 was that their money was being used for the construction of forts and for the equipment of an army which could only be employed for purposes opposed to their best interests.

In fact, of all the important results of the discovery of gold in the Transvaal, perhaps the most important, from the point of view of the Dutch Republic, was that it placed within the hands of a naturally warlike people the means to convert themselves into a fully-armed military state, organized and equipped on modern principles. Men had never been wanting for such a purpose, but modern military efficiency is largely a matter of expense, and it was only by the industry of the Uitlanders that the difficulty presented by the enormous cost of carrying out the scheme was overcome.

IV.

RUPTURE.

In 1895 the relations between the Boer Government and the Uitlanders had become so strained that the choice was on all hands recognized to lie between redress and revolution.

As early as 1892 Mr. Kruger had replied personally to an influential Uitlander deputation which had waited upon him, "Go back and tell your people that I shall never give them anything; I shall never change my policy; and now let the storm burst." In 1894 the Transvaal Raad confirmed this attitude of the President when it received a Uitlander petition for redress of grievances bearing 35,000 signatures with absolute refusal to make any concession and the assurance that if the Uitlanders wanted the franchise they would have to fight for it. All this, it must be remembered, was before the raid.

The Volksraad session of 1895, instead of ameliorating the position of the Uitlanders, made their position distinctly worse, and clearly revealed, by the laws and enactments which were carried, the fixed determination of the Government to effect no reform. In 1895 the capitalists of Johannesburg, who had hitherto held aloof, formally associated themselves with the Reform movement, and from that moment revolution became a certainty.

Towards the end of 1895 President Kruger, notwithstanding the danger of his position, ventured on a step which was an open breach of the Convention. He closed the drifts or fords by which goods, carried on the Cape and Natal and Orange Free State railways, entered the Transvaal, intending by the act to force traffic over his own line by Delagoa Bay. He was informed by what was practically a joint ultimatum from the Imperial Government and the Cape Colony that his action could not be permitted, and he rescinded his declaration. That he should have made it is significant of two points—his readiness to separate the interests of the Transvaal from those of the other Dutch populations of South Africa and his intention to test British endurance to its limits.

In the first week of 1896 the movement took place with which was connected the regrettable incident of the Jameson raid. The telegram in which the German Emperor congratulated President Kruger on his victory at Doornkop was for the moment held to substantiate the rumors current in South Africa of a secret understanding between Germany and the Transvaal, and to justify all the doubts which had been entertained of President Kruger's good faith towards Great Britain. The excitement which followed the publication of the telegram was largely due to that impression, and may be said to have marked the highest point of emotion stirred by President Kruger's intrigues for foreign support. The general understanding between Germany and Great Britain which has been practically cemented by recent agreements removes that element of danger from the horizon. In the years which have elapsed since the raid President Kruger is believed in this country to have learned that neither from Germany nor from Portugal can he expect to receive encouragement in any project which involves the overthrow of British supremacy in South Africa.

The check received in this direction does not appear to have brought wisdom to President Kruger's counsels. He was not led to abandon his design for republicanizing South Africa. Orders for arms, instead of being diminished, were increased. So extensive did they become that two years more would have been required to complete them. The quantity ordered is said to be sufficient to arm the whole Dutch population of South Africa twice over. The building of forts was hurriedly pressed on. The drill and reorganization of the Transvaal military forces were carried forward under the charge of qualified European instructors. The military alliance with the Free State was strengthened, and political propaganda in the British colonies became more active.

Circumstances pointed, according to the best information which the British authorities have been able to collect, to an intention on the part of the Transvaal to complete its preparations and to bring the situation to a climax at a period of their own choosing about two years hence. By that time it was hoped that the military forces of the Transvaal and the Free State would be placed on a broader footing, fully armed and drilled, that propaganda in the British colonies would have done its work, and that organization for the distribution of arms in disaffected British districts would have been complete. If there was no hope of a European alliance for the Transvaal there was always hope that a moment might be chosen to strike the blow when European complications might render it difficult for England to exert her full strength in South Africa.

The war party of the Transvaal, getting out of hand, frustrated by precipitate action the execution of this plan, and the matter was, in a sense, taken out of the hands of the British Government. It was not by any determined protest on the part of the Imperial authorities that the complete preparation of the two Republics for revolt was interfered with. On the contrary, in this case, as in all others in which we have dealt to our disadvantage with the Transvaal Government, the principle of concession and toleration has been carried to its furthest limits. We had full knowledge of their armaments, but we allowed them to arm. We knew something of their plans and of the political propaganda which they were carrying on in the two British colonies, but with constitutional

indifference to intrigue we allowed them to proceed. Throughout the negotiations of last summer there was hardly a moment at which, if they had chosen, the Boer Government could not have obtained a settlement composing more than half our legitimate causes of complaint by a compromise that would have left the Boer position practically unaffected.

But under the inspiration of the more extreme members of his ministry, and believing himself to be sufficiently prepared to have a substantial prospect of achieving victory in arms, President Kruger preferred the open defiance of an ultimatum. By the terms of his communication to the British Government of October 9th he arrogated to the Transvaal without disguise the position of supremacy in South Africa hitherto claimed and occupied by Great Britain. The plan of campaign of the Boers we have since been informed was to over-run Natal, trusting to an uprising of the Dutch population to place the entire colony in their hands; to attack Port Elizabeth and Cape Town, and in the event of failure, which was anticipated for these attacks, to withdraw to the Stormberg and Hex River Mountains, where it was believed that the position could be held "forever" against any force that could be marched up from the sea. Foreign intervention, according to Boer calculations, was to do the rest, and give to an apparently desperate struggle its hope of ultimate success.

This scheme of military operations has been foiled, but the events of the last four months have demonstrated how well the Boers have profited by the opportunities which British industry within their borders first placed within their hands, and which British instincts in favor of liberty and non-interference outside their borders allowed them to turn to full account. At the moment of the outbreak of war they commanded the strongest military power in South Africa. Not only so. During the long negotiations which preceded war it was held—rightly or wrongly—by responsible British Ministers that the prospects of a peaceful issue would have been seriously prejudiced by military movements on our part bearing the aspect of preparations for war, and that they best interpreted the feeling of this country by abstaining rigidly from such movements. Nothing can bear stronger testimony to the spirit of good faith in which the negotiations were conducted on the British side than the fact that the failure of the negotiations found Great Britain totally unprepared to provide even for the defence of her own colonial frontiers. President Kruger and his advisers took a different view of the situation, and under cover of the negotiations for peace the Transvaal Government took the opportunity of steadily and silently mobilizing its military forces, which were already massed on the frontiers of the British colonies at the moment of the declaration of war. We now know that the ultimatum of the Transvaal Government had been prepared for nearly a fortnight before it was delivered, and that the delivery was delayed by an unexpected hitch in the working of the local transport which prevented the Boer troops from concentrating on the frontier quite so early as had been intended. Having made up his mind to fight, President Kruger is not to be blamed for completing his preparations, and choosing this most favorable moment for attack. That is according to all laws of battle the inalienable right of the aggressor. But it gave him a great military advantage in the opening portion of the campaign.

The annexation of the Transvaal to Great Britain was proclaimed and the change was effected in absolute peace. No force was used or displayed. The principal officials of the Transvaal Government, including Mr. Paul Kruger, took office under the British Government. The new Government restored the finances of the country, fought the Zulus, fought Sikukuni, and broke for ever the power of surrounding native tribes.

Then when the advantages of annexation had been reaped, when the dangers of bankruptcy and annihilation had been averted, and the militant energies of the Boer people had had time to recover, the bargain with Great Britain was repudiated. Annexation no longer seemed desirable. Revolution and a declaration of independence followed.

Great Britain, from the beginning of her relations with the Transvaal, had shown the clearest desire to abstain from interference. Under somewhat modified conditions, she has displayed in her relations to the Dutch Republics the same spirit of tolerance and respect for local wishes which has rendered possible within the empire the unique growth and development of our great self-governing colonies. If the Transvaal had been willing, as our colonies have been willing, to take freedom, of which itself should set the measure, and to give loyalty to its engagements in return, there need have been no more friction between us and the Dutch outside the empire than there has been between us and British colonists within the Empire.

The grant of independence to the emigrant farmers had been made in 1852 without any trial of strength and purely as an act of grace, dictated by a policy which desired to assume no further responsibilities in South Africa. The flagrant and habitual violation of the conditions under which independence was granted had been passed over without remonstrance. It was not till the hostile attitude of the Zulus and other native tribes threatened the Transvaal with extinction and presented a serious danger to British South Africa that any thought of intervening in Transvaal affairs was entertained. Intervention then was made in response to an invitation from the Transvaal, and that this was so in fact as well as in name was demonstrated by the absolutely peaceful manner in which annexation was effected.

We spent upwards of £6,000,000 on the Zulu war, as well as many British lives. Having done that, having restored industrial and financial prosperity to the country and found at the end of our exertions that a change in public opinion had taken place, and that the Boers of the Transvaal desired that the independence of their country should be restored, we gave it back subject only to certain conditions which were judged to be essential in order to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis at any future date.

The forces engaged on the British side at Majuba numbered less than 500 men. We had 12,000 troops upon the sea. There can be no reasonable contention that that concession was in any way forced from us by the issue of so unimportant a skirmish in arms. We gave the Transvaal back her autonomy after Majuba because the development of events had convinced the British statesmen responsible for the conduct of affairs that the revolt which had culminated at Majuba was not the mere insubordination of a faction, but expressed the sentiment of Dutch South Africa.

Nothing could more clearly demonstrate our desire to act in accordance with that sentiment. Lord Kimberley's explanation, given the other day, adds nothing to and takes nothing from this view.

In view of all that the annexation of the Transvaal had cost us, we had a right to safeguard the future peace of South Africa and the future position of Great Britain by imposing certain conditions upon the retrocession. It is difficult to imagine conditions less onerous than those which were embodied in the terms of peace of the Convention of 1881. But the Transvaal had no sooner been given back than these conditions were broken.

Great Britain was the party aggrieved. Nevertheless, Great Britain agreed to revise the conditions of 1881, bringing them more into accordance with Dutch wishes. Accordingly a fresh convention embodying important concessions was negotiated in 1884. Within a year a breach of the new conditions necessitated the despatch of the Warren expedition at a cost of nearly £2,000,000 to Great Britain. The very liberality of our terms of internal independence to the Transvaal made it essential that the territorial limits within which that independence should be exercised should be clearly defined. The Convention of 1884 defined the boundaries of the Transvaal. The Transvaal Government bound itself faithfully to observe the frontier limits then laid down. There is not one of its frontiers on which it has not since attempted to extend its limits. In two cases it has made the attempt with conspicuous success. There is scarcely a provision of the Convention which the Transvaal Government has not either broken or attempted to break. It has openly defied the provisions intended to secure the equality of white men within its borders. It has subjected British subjects to humiliating disabilities. It endeavored in 1895 to close its frontiers to British trade. It has steadily pursued an anti-British policy. It has openly declared the intention of protecting the interests and cultivating the friendship of foreign nations in a spirit of opposition to Great Britain. It has spent enormous sums in preparing itself for an armed conflict with Great Britain. It has finally thrown off the mask and, having drawn the Orange Free State, which had not even the shadow of a quarrel with Great Britain, into an alliance, it has declared the design of inducing British South Africa to throw off its allegiance to the Queen.

The one occasion during fifty years of mutual history in which the part of the Transvaal has not been that of aggressor or of suppliant for favors is the unfortunate incident of the Jameson raid. No justification can be offered for what actually occurred on that occasion. In the circumstances Dr. Jameson had no right to cross the frontier. But it has to be remembered that his action, however unjustifiable, was a consequence and not a cause. The internal revolt in which his co-operation had been sought had been induced by conditions for which the Transvaal Government alone was responsible. It was the unwillingness, not the readiness, of the British Government to intervene which threw the foreign population of the Transvaal on its own resources; and, though it has been sought to attribute to the mistrust and irritation caused by the Jameson raid the policy which has culminated in the armament of the Transvaal, facts do not bear out this assumption. Long before the date of the raid the Transvaal Government had begun to arm and had placed the reor-

ganization of its military forces in the hands of competent foreign instructors. It was one of the leading complaints of the Uitlanders in the years preceding the raid that so large a portion of their money was being spent in military preparations. As the Transvaal was an internal Power whose foreign relations were in British hands, such armaments could only be directed against Great Britain; and in South Africa the defiance involved by the preparations was not misunderstood. It would be more accurate to say that the armament of the Transvaal produced the Jameson raid than that the Jameson raid produced the armament of the Transvaal.

From first to last it can be shown that the history of the Transvaal has been one long aggression upon its neighbors' rights. Never, perhaps, in history has a dominant Power showed itself more tolerant or more generous than Great Britain in its dealings with this little State. Whether this tolerance has been prompted by motives of interest or motives of sentiment is practically immaterial. The Transvaal in either case has benefited by the result.

That the Transvaal should now be conducting—with a stubbornness and bravery that we all admire—a practically hopeless struggle in arms against the greater Power roused at last, is but a supreme expression of the militant spirit by which the Boers of the Transvaal have always endeavored to dominate the surrounding peoples. Domination, not independence, has been their aim.

The history of the two peoples shows that Great Britain has not only tolerated, she was in early days anxious to promote, the independence of the Dutch Republics. She has never desired to interfere with that independence. Up to the moment of the declaration of war she had no quarrel of any kind with the Orange Free State. But the predominance of any other Power in South Africa is incompatible with the maintenance of the position won for this Empire at the cost of blood and treasure freely poured out by generations of Britons. In defending this position Great Britain has a right to look for the sympathy and moral support of continental nations. For what is incompatible with her interests is also incompatible with theirs. The predominance in South Africa of a power based on military aggression would be a source of constant danger to territorial neighbors on every side. Peace, good order and equality of industrial opportunity represent practically the demands of the civilized world in South Africa. The republic beyond the Vaal has signalized its short existence by a blank refusal to satisfy these demands in the territory which lies under its rule. The extension of Dutch influence would necessarily mean a corresponding restriction of the development of the resources of the country. Great Britain, on the other hand, has been the guardian of these general interests since she first established herself at Cape Town. Her ascendancy in South Africa is a guarantee to Europe that from the Zambesi to the Indian Ocean every citizen of every nationality shall enjoy the same protection and profit by the same opportunity as if he lived under the shadow of his own flag. Advantages which are freely shared give no occasion for envy, and none know better than our continental neighbors that South Africa British is South Africa open to the world.

GRIEVANCES OF THE UITLANDERS.

John Hays Hammond, the well-known American mining engineer, who for many years resided in the Transvaal, outlines the grievances of the Uitlanders as follows :

Today England is fighting, among other things, for the establishment of the principle that there shall be no taxation without representation. In the English colonies of South Africa there is absolute equality for both Dutch and English, both obtain the franchise on the same terms. The language of both races is used in the parliaments and in the courts of justice in the British colonies of South Africa. England is fighting, among other causes, for the extension of this principle throughout South Africa generally.

The franchise law in the Transvaal is that the applicant must renounce in the first instance allegiance to all other countries; he is then under probation for a period of fourteen years, during which time he is a citizen of no country whatever, and has no rights that any Boer is bound to respect. During these fourteen years he must be ready to serve in the Boer army at twelve hours' notice, without pay, and provide his own clothing and food. At the end of these fourteen years of degrading humiliation he must have the consent of two-thirds of the Boers in his district and the petty officer commanding before citizenship is granted. After passing through all this ordeal he only receives the right to vote for the second chamber, which has been carefully bereft of all power—a legislature that cannot legislate.

According to our Declaration of Independence, "Governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed."

Two-thirds of the Transvaal population were Outlanders. We went thither by express invitation; our capital and enterprise developed what in Boer hands was worthless territory into the greatest mining center of the world; the country, now rich, was bankrupt before our arrival; we owned more than half the land, having purchased it from the Boers; *we paid nine-tenths of the taxes*, much of which amount was admitted by the Boer commission to be class taxation, and yet we had to submit to unlawful expenditure of the bulk of taxation, as we had no voice in the government.

We objected to the subversion of the high court of justice, in which rested our only hope of legal redress. In direct contravention of the *grondwit* (the Boer constitution), the *volksraad* empowered the President and Executive Council to dismiss any Judge without trial who disputed the validity of any law passed by the *Volksraad*, even when such law conflicted with the *grondwit*. President Kruger exercised his privilege in summarily removing a Chief Justice who had for many years honestly and ably filled that office. Afterward all the Judges were simply the President's tools.

We objected to the jury system; we were debarred from proper trial, as the law makes only burghers eligible for jury duty. Nor was any Boer jury ever known to convict a Boer who had murdered a native.

We objected to the alien's expulsion act, by which an Outlander can be put over the border at the will of the President without the right of

appeal to a court of justice—a course open to the offending burgher. This law was obviously opposed to the British-Boer convention of 1884. A similar law passed in this country under John Adams' administration wrecked the Federal party.

We objected to the prohibition of free speech, to the power vested in the President of suppressing any publication which, in his individual opinion, was opposed to good manners or subversive of order. He did not hesitate to exercise his despotic power toward newspapers which supported Outlander interests, while newspapers which supported the Boer Government were allowed to publish libelous articles and even to advocate atrocious crimes without interference.

We objected to the Johannesburg police force. For the shooting and killing of a British subject a policeman was recently released on \$1000 bail, less than the amount demanded from Outlanders in trivial cases.

We objected to the public meetings act, which left discretionary power in the hands of Boer policemen to suppress assemblages.

We objected to the high death rate prevailing in Johannesburg owing to the insanitation which the community was powerless to prevent under Boer maladministration.

We objected to being taxed to maintain schools in which Dutch was exclusively taught. A resolution introduced in the Volksraad that no English should be allowed to be taught even in private schools was defeated by only one vote.

We objected to the Boers being exclusively allowed to carry firearms.

We objected to the maladministration of laws as to native labor, the Boers lying in wait to rob the natives of their earnings on their way from the mines to their homes.

Finally, we objected to the prevalent official corruption and to the granting of concessions giving monopolies for the sale of supplies indispensable to the Outlanders. With the concessionnaires, Government officials were generally associated in the great profit derived. In the grant of a recent railway concession it was proved in court that twenty-one out of the twenty-five members of the Volksraad had received bribes.

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